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Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process. By Robert M.
Cover. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975. Pp. xii,
322. $15.00.
Reviewed by Eugene D. Genoveset
Professor Cover apparently intended this impressive and disturbing
book primarily as a contribution to a deeper understanding of the
historical development of the law and of the recurring dilemma con-
fronting those charged with enforcing unjust laws. In these tasks he
has acquitted himself splendidly, even in the eyes of a critic who
thinks he has fudged more than he meant to and perhaps more than
he knows. Cover's finest achievement lies in the realm of intellectual
and institutional history, for as David Brion Davis observes in a state-
ment for the bookjacket (imagine: a careful, accurate assessment on
a book jacket!)-"The result is interdisciplinary history at its best-
an indispensable work for legal philosophers as well as for American
historians."
Still glancing at the recent events in Vietnam, Cover brings a tough-
mindedness tempered by a decent appreciation of human frailty to
his painstaking and learned account of antislavery judges compelled,
as they thought, to enforce proslavery legislation. His sketches of the
radical and moderate abolitionists as well as the luminaries of the
bench are, on the whole, well-balanced and compassionate while in-
tellectually and morally rigorous. His effort commands respect and
admiration, and his ideas and analyses deserve the widest reflection
in and out of the legal and historical professions. Yet Justice Accused
remains deeply disquieting in ways Cover probably did not intend
and points toward some conclusions he may not like.
Cover tells us that his book is "the story of earnest, well-meaning
pillars of legal respectability and of their collaboration in a system of
t Professor of History, University of Rochester.
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oppression-Negro slavery."' Much of the challenge of this book is
directed against the common claim that judges must be relieved of
responsibility for the moral content of the specific laws they enforce.
Cover argues that "a static and simplistic model of law" leaves a judge
only four choices when caught between morality and the law: to ap-
ply the law against conscience; to follow conscience and be unfaithful
to the law; to resign; or to find a way to cheat.
2
For Cover, however, the judge has a legitimate role in determining
what the law will become: he is an active agent in the working out
of the law's moral content. The extreme formulations of both radical
moralism and legal formalism obscure actual historical process, and
carried far enough provide rationalizations for a deeper irresponsi-
bility. Cover is careful, however, to dissect ideological, social, and pro-
fessional history in order to reveal the psychological and institutional
framework within which the judges found themselves. He thereby
avoids, or at least holds to a minimum, anachronistic moral pro-
nouncements and at the same time illuminates historical process and
the probabilities of choice within it.
To his great credit, Cover is more concerned with teaching than
preaching and provides an impressive account of the natural law tra-
dition to which the antislavery judges fell heir and of the various
constraints which confined the courts by the second quarter of the
nineteenth century. Still, it is difficult for those of us who do not
share Cover's apparent liberal ideology not to appreciate the force of
Bentham's blast at natural law: "I see no remedy but that the natural
tendency of such [a] doctrine is to impel a man, by the force of con-
science, to rise up in arms against any law whatever that he happens
not to like."3 Cover also appreciates the force of the objection and
skillfully tries to steer between its implications and a retreat into
formalism. I am afraid, however, that the objection remains. For we
know, as Cover surely does, that although judges can provide living
space for themselves and defendants between the suffocating extremes
of abstractions, this opportunity tells us little or nothing about the
principles by which men ought to live within that space.
Among the virtues of Justice Accused is an account of the way in
which "skeptical conservatism" and "rationalistic reform" converged
to undermine the appeal to natural law by the beginning of the nine-
teenth century. "The most telling aspect of the American variant of
constitutional positivism," Cover writes, "was the enthusiasm for writ-
1. R. CovER, JusncE AccusED (1975) [hereinafter cited to page only].
2. P. 6.
3. P. 24, quoting J. BErrHAM, FRAGMENT § 19, at 110 (1823 ed.).
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ten constitutions-the almost compulsive mania for rendering the al-
location of power explicit. ' 4 And he adds, "Above all, the tradition
of positivism meant that the judge ought to be will-less." (Cover's
fine aesthetic eye closes here: he misses the irony that will-less is pre-
cisely what, in every slaveholder's fantasy, the perfect slave is supposed
to be.) Here and in his valuable discussion of the threat that the
passionate conflict over slavery posed to the independence of the ju-
diciary, Cover implicitly confronts the latent antagonism between re-
publicanism, with its prime value of freedom, and democracy, with
its intrinsic tendency to surrender freedom for equality. Thus, in dis-
cussing the free and equal clause of the Virginia Constitution, he
suggests that the reality and importance of slavery in Virginia "pre-
sented in the starkest form the question of whether judges act ac-
cording to large principles or specific intentions." Everyone knew,
he acknowledges, that the framers had not intended to abolish slavery.
But, he adds, "The question was, whether they had done something
without knowing or intending it; whether the words of natural law,
once 'declared,' have a life of their own."'7 Very well. But if I may
paraphrase that shrewd proslavery extremist George Fitzhugh: carry
out the doctrine implicit in your question and you will subvert every
government on earth-especially, one might add, every democratic
government. For the plain bias of an active judiciary is antidemo-
cratic, the more so as it usurps the attractive role of defender of free-
dom. And only in America could the antithesis between democracy
and freedom appear other than as intrinsic and fail to be brought
out sharply even in the work of our best scholars.
This book, in its own way, nonetheless demonstrates the slimness
of the thread by which freedom sustains itself in modern democratic
society. The only justification for setting limits to the power of some
men over others-unless we invoke God's Revealed Truth-is an agreed-
upon sense of a good and decent life. Unfortunately, no such ideal,
even were one arrived at as a collective judgment, could stand alone
against the pressures of discrete material interests and the imaginative
efforts of those trained "to distinguish." The rule of law and that
mania for written constitutions which Cover derides represent brave
efforts to institutionalize decency and good sense and to take full
account of both man's creative potential and his withering capacity
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efforts also lay the foundations for a moral justification of passivity
toward palpable injustice.
Nor, indeed, does the Revealed Word of God offer a secure way
out for those imbued with republican or democratic principles or for
anyone who values freedom in any meaningful sense of the word.
Levi Lincoln made this point in his bullying remarks in one of the
Quock Walker cases: he threatened the court with an appeal to God,
who would invoke "the laws of reason and revelation." s But Revela-
tion as a guide to social action requires-Protestant sensibilities not-
withstanding-a Church to interpret it, if the same problems are not
to reassert themselves in a different language. And since the Church,
as any wise priest would freely admit, consists of fallible men, we
end with the need to obey a positive law legitimately derived from
an appropriate social consensus.
The only consistent justification for a hard abolitionist line could
have been some variant of Hegel's powerful refutation of slavery's first
principle,9 a principle chillingly enunciated by Judge Thomas Ruffin
of North Carolina in his famous 1829 opinion in State v. Mann.10
But Judge Ruffin or no, slaveholders' consensus or no, the reduction
of the slave to a thing-to a mere extension of the master's will-ran
8. P. 47. The Quock Walker cases, which according to "long-standing tradition" held
that slavery violated the Massachusetts constitution, arose when Quock Walker, allegedly
a slave, ran away to work for a neighbor. Pp. 44, 46. In one of the actions arising
out of the incident, Levi Lincoln defended the neighbor in a suit by the master for
damages. Caldwell v. Jennison (Mass. Super. Ct. of Judicature, 1781) (citation to the
record of the case in Cushing, The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in
Massachusetts: More Notes on the "Quoch Walker Case," 5 Am. J. LEG. HisTr. 118, 121
n.6 (1961).
9. In his famous discussion of lordship and bondage in THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND
228-40 (J.B. Baillie trans. 1967), Hegel argued that power over things would be insuf-
ficient to enable men to achieve self-consciousness and that men could only attain it
through perception of their position in an adversary relationship. The master's self-
consciousness depended upon his perception of power over his slave, a perception de-
termined by the slave's assertion of independent will. The slave perceived not only his
dependence upon the master but also the reverse, since the labor process exposed the
degree to which the master depended upon the slave's work. Hegel argued that slavery
made no sense, morally or politically, except on the assumption that one man could
determine the will of another. Hegel pointed out, in summarizing his devastating
critique of such pretensions, that such a surrender of will reduces to a logical ab-
surdity since it can only be effected, if at all, through the willing alienation by one
ostensibly without a will to alienate.
10. 13 N.C. (2 Deveraux) 263 (1829) (holding that the intentional wounding of a hired
slave by the hirer could not constitute a crime). For Cover's discussion of the case, see
p. 77. Confronted with the assertion that the slave's condition paralleled that of a
child, Judge Ruffin put the matter bluntly:
With slavery it is far otherwise. The end is the profit of the master, his security
and the public safety; the subject, one doomed in his own person, and his posterity,
to live without knowledge, and without the capacity to make anything his own, and
to toil that another may reap the fruits. . . Such services can only be expected
from one who has no will of his own ....
13 N.C. (2 Deveraux) at 266.
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afoul of the slave's humanity and, in particular, of his very human
capacity for killing and insurrection. The validity of Hegel's philo-
sophical refutation of slavery's ultimate rationale was constantly con-
firmed in day-to-day master-slave relations and finally impressed itself
even on the Southern courts. But Hegel's refutation cannot readily
be divorced from the classical political economy that alone offered
a coherent alternative doctrine of obligation, and that political econ-
omy, as Hegel clearly perceived, rested squarely on absolute, (i.e.,
bourgeois) property." The Northern judges therefore did have an
antislavery course open to them-one that need not have collapsed
into the vagaries of natural law nor retreated into the complicity of
an inflexible positivism. They might have taken their stand on the
unanswerable ground that any recognition of man's property in man
surrendered the entire ideological foundation of Northern society
and thereby subverted its political system.' 2
The genius of American politics, however, has lain in its triumphant,
if ultimately unstable, reconciliation of those conflicting doctrines put
forward during Europe's Age of Revolution and largely interred on
the Parisian barricades of the June Days of 1848: liberty, equality,
and democracy in one neat package. Whereas European politics and
ideology, increasingly divided over the "social-i.e., class-question,"
11. Hegel's refutation of slavery in THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF M][IND, supra note 9, and
in his later work, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans. 1953), was rooted in his
analysis of the problem of freedom in modern society. He followed a distinguished line
of classical English and Scottish economists and French Physiocrats in denouncing slavery
as destructive to that civic resonsibility and participation which alone made freedom
possible even for a ruling class. Thus in PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT he observed, "A slave
can have no duties; only a free man has them." Id. at 261.
The refutation of slavery also rested on the main point of the classical economists-
that freedom of labor (or as Marx more cogently put it, the transformation of labor
power into a commodity) alone fulfilled the demand for recognition of the inviolability
of the human personality, and that freedom of labor could have no social force except
in a society based on the bourgeois principle of absolute property. From this point of
view, slavery was both a moral abomination and a denial of the entire moral basis
of free society; it could not be tolerated as a mere peripheral unpleasantness or a
"peculiar institution." When, therefore, the Southerners demanded that the Northern
courts acknowledge the legitimacy of slavery-in any form, in any part of the country,
or at any level of intensity-they demanded, as the abolitionists understood, uncon-
ditional surrender at the decisive level of struggle.
12. The slaveholders threatened to expose the limits of the brilliant reconciliation
of freedom and equality sketched by classical political economy and brought to fruition
in Hegel's philosophy. In bourgeois theory, freedom and equality are linked through
the reduction of equality to its formal aspect as the confrontation of autonomous units
in a free market. The deeper problem of the social content of equality, raised so
sharply by Rousseau, is thereby circumvented. But once freedom of labor is attacked,
so is the theory of absolute ,-ourgeois property on which it rests. Thus, the Northern
courts might have declared slavery in any form incompatible with the nature of American
society and with the raison d'etre of the legal system itself.
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pitted liberals against democrats and steadily drove democrats to so-
cialism, things were being ordered better in America.13
The price for that better ordering was suppression of the class
question and, with it, a papering over of the chasm separating the
republican commitment to liberty from the democratic commitment
to equality and social justice. Thus, Northern bourgeois thought, es-
pecially legal thought, dared not take the high ground staked out by
Hegel, for its class content could not be disguised. And besides-a
small matter obscured by Cover-to take such a position would have
unleashed secession and war. By rejecting such a solution, Northern
society could take an easy view of its own first principles and avoid
confrontation not only with itself, but with the slave states, increas-
ingly organized as an alternative society with an alternative moral
sensibility. Cover marvellously describes the growing transformation
of the courts into a theatre for guerrilla politics, but his focus on the
moral-formal dilemma within the North itself draws attention away
from the deeper and more pressing political problem: the Northern
courts were becoming irrelevant to a struggle between rival social
systems that were advancing irreconcilable moral principles.
From this point of view the position of such judges as Story, Shaw,
McLean, and Swan acquires greater dignity than Cover's valuable
intellectual, institutional, and psychological critique would allow.
Rarely does Cover take cheap shots, but I fear that he comes close
to doing so in his repeated slighting of the argument from the prin-
ciple of "Union." For example, he has Judge McLean asserting in
effect that a judge ought not to explore the natural justice of slavery
unless he is prepared to destroy the "social compact."'14 And later,
Cover writes that McLean consistently appealed to the dichotomy be-
tween law and anarchy.15 But I see no reason to read "anarchy" in
so narrow a way as to suggest merely a congenital conservative fear
of a breakdown in the social order. McLean and other judges, as
Cover's own account shows, justifiably saw the Constitution as a bar-
gain between North and South, and therefore between alternative
moral principles. They also understood that those rival moral prin-
ciples had potential armies and hordes of militants standing behind
them. For these judges, then, the choice was by no means solely be-
tween the moral and the formal within their own society-and that
choice was hard enough.
13. For an excellent historical introduction to these questions, see E. HoUSBAwm,
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In effect, the judges were refusing to assume responsibility for un-
leashing secession and a war to which their society was as yet unwilling
to commit itself. Their impotence in the face of the enormity of the
Fugitive Slave Law marked a confession that the resolution of the
slavery question lay beyond the power of the courts, not merely in
the formal sense of "I Cannot," but in the direct political sense of
genuine powerlessness.' 6
The slaveholders were not fools, and their more militant leaders
were not men readily hustled. They knew, and said, that enforcement
of the Fugitive Slave Law was the critical test of Northern intentions.
And they knew, as discerning Northerners knew, that any retreat from
a strict, no-nonsense enforcement, no matter how ingenious the ju-
dicial creativity, would constitute an attack on the morality of slave-
holding,. 7 Indeed, were that not so, Cover would have had to look
elsewhere for a historical problem to analyze. The weakness in Cover's
searching analysis, therefore, lies in his failure to make a political
and ideological assessment of the development of Southern society
and its impact upon the Northern judiciary. I find his treatment the
more distressing since he clearly sees that "Ruffin articulated better
than any other judge the position that the master-slave relationship
is a creature of force and force alone and that the law must reflect
the cruel origins of the relationship."' I s Yet Cover does not offer an
evaluation of the impact of this thinking on the Southern courts,
much less on the Southern politicians and community leaders, whose
commitment to the logic of slavery was probably "more advanced"
than that of the courts themselves.
Thus, although Cover has to his credit the extraordinary achieve-
ment of laying bare, through penetrating historical analysis, the full
force of the moral-formal dilemma and of suggesting a way out of it
on his own chosen terrain of discourse, he by-passes the ultimate
question of the terrain itself. What happens when two ranges of moral
sensibility, rooted in antagonistic property systems, conflict and there-
16. When Cover speaks of the doctrine of "cannot" (he begins Chapter Seven with
"The Judicial "Can't"), he appeals to a psychological model premised on conceptions
of "conflict resolution." These conceptions do not especially illuminate his text and are
open to sharp challenge from psychoanalytic (and other) points of view.
17. My view of antebellum Southern society is not shared by all historians. Since
Cover avoids these issues, I do not know where he stands. But those who wish an
elaboration of the view I am sketching here may consult E. GENOVESE, THE WORLD
THE SLAVEHOLDERS MIADE: Two ESSAYS IN INTERPRETATION (1969) and, for an assessment
of the ideological aspect of the law, E. GENOvESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: TiE WORLD
THE SLAVES MADE 25-49 (1974).
18. P. 77 n.*.
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by challenge the very notion of "moral"?1 Cover discusses selected
Southern responses to the same moral-formal problem-that is, he
traces the problems created by adherence to "Northern" principles
within the South-but he is virtually silent about the decisive forma-
tion of an alternative moral view. The question I am raising bears
only superficial resemblance to the one on which Cover concentrates.
For, in essence, the slaveholders denied that slavery was immoral;
they did not simply assert "property rights" against "human rights"
and thereby agree to play the Northern game. And since the slave-
holders possessed considerable regionally-based political and military
power, their challenge differed qualitatively from that posed by in-
ternal dissidents. At that point, the Northern judicial system tottered
on the brink of political irrelevance, as any judicial system must
when the consensual basis of society collapses or is revealed as without
foundation.
Had the antislavery judge done other than swallow their scruples
and enforce the law, they would have, consciously or not, moved
the North sharply toward an internal polarization preparatory to
waging an external war. One may devoutly wish they had done
just that. But that wish is tantamount to a recognition of the judicial
role as frankly political and extra-judicial, a recognition which the
several types of abolitionists struggled to make everyone acknowledge.
Cover makes this point obliquely when he brilliantly traces the way
in which the antislavery judges, by their retreat into formalism, un-
wittingly took an opposite political position and isolated the aboli-
tionists on a narrow terrain on which they could be smashed.2 0 In
other ways, too, Cover displays a sharp sense of political dialectics-
for example, in his account of Garrisonian and anti-Garrisonian abo-
litionist strategies, tactics, and results.2 1 It is the ultimate political
question that he somehow drowns in his own version of legalism.
The last word, prefigured in the hand-wringing apologetics of Judge
McLean, goes to the Chairman: on the terrain of irreconcilable
class antagonisms-and therefore of conflicting moral visions-political
19. I have the uneasy feeling that Cover veers closer than he might wish to the
viewpoint advanced during the happy days of the 1960s by the anarchist wing of the
Left. I have yet to hear how, without the intervention of the Good Lord-whose Word
somehow always means something different to me than it does to liberals and Quaker
radicals-a case can be made for a moral standard on grounds other than historical
consensus. But I have stated my views on this question in Staughton Lynd as Historian
and Ideologue and A Question of Morals in E. GENOVESE, IN RrD AND BLACK: MARXIAN
EXPLORATIONS IN SOUTHERN AND AFRO-AMERICAN HISTORY (1971).
20. P. 221.
21. See pp. 150-58.
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power does in fact, however disagreeable the thought, grow out of
the barrel of a gun. The Civil War obviously could not solve the
moral-formal dilemma, but it did solve the pressing historical prob-
lem posed by two societies within a single national-state, for it de-
stroyed the social basis of the only alternative moral vision American
liberalism has ever had to confront at home. The slaveholders, too,
prefigured the Chairman. Noting the inability of Northerners and
Southerners to appeal any longer to a common moral standard, they
concluded: "The argument is exhausted; let every man stand to
his arms."
Justice Brandeis: The Confirmation Struggle
and the Zionist Movement
Letters of Louis D. Brandeis-Volume IV (1916-1921): Mr. Justice
Brandeis. Edited by Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy. Albany,
New York: State University of New York Press, 1975. Pp. xxiii, 587.
$32.00.
Reviewed by Michael Boudint
This fourth volume of the letters of Louis D. Brandeis embraces
only six years in a professional career that spanned six decades.' Yet
in this brief period, from 1916 through mid-1921, there occurred
two events of singular interest in Brandeis's life: the long and bitter
struggle over the Brandeis nomination to the Supreme Court and
Justice Brandeis's active leadership of the American Zionist movement
during confirmation and his early years on the Court.
In the opening pages, the confirmation fight predominates. Brandeis
was nominated by Woodrow Wilson in January, 1916, and the nomi-
nation was met almost at once by fierce opposition. Conservative Bos-
tonians, boasting Harvard President A. Lawrence Lowell among them,
petitioned the Senate against the nomination; editorials inveighed
against Brandeis as a radical; and segments of the bar denounced
Brandeis as unethical in character and unjudicial in temperament, in
a campaign culminating in a letter of opposition signed by ex-Presi-
dent Taft and six other present or former presidents of the American
Bar Association.
2
As the parade of attacks followed inside the Senate committee
t Member, District of Columbia Bar.
1. Previous volumes encompass correspondence during 1870-1907, 1907-1912, and 1913-
1915. The published letters are only a fraction of thousands. I LTERs OF Louis D.
BRANDEIS xvi (M. Urofsky & D. Levy eds. 1971).
2. Almost three years later Brandeis wrote to his wife:
Had an experience yesterday which I did not expect to encounter in this life. As I
was walking toward the Stoneleigh [Court apartment building] about I P.M., Taft
& I met. There was a moment's hesitation, & when he'd almost passed, lie stopped
& said in a charming manner: "Isn't this Justice Brandeis? I don't think we have
ever met." . . . He at once began to talk about my views on regularity of employ-
ment .... He spent a half hour in 809 [Stoneleigh], talking labor & War Labor Board
experiences. Was most confidential-at one point put his hand on my knee.
IV LrTERs OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 370 (M. Urofsky & D. Levy eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited
to page number only].
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room and out, Brandeis at first professed detachment. "The hear-
ings," he wrote his brother, "seems [sic] to be a fit method of clearing
the atmosphere. However, it is not my fight."" Again: "[M]y feeling
is rather-'Go it husband, Go it bear' with myself as 'interested spec-
tator.' "4Actually, the letters show that Brandeis was an active par-
ticipant, privately furnishing to his aides and supporters the facts
needed to answer the successive charges against him growing out of
his law practice and reform activities.
Brandeis's letters concerning the confirmation battle are of a piece:
organized, impersonal, stuffed with facts, forceful in substance but
spare in style. Most are to Edward McClennen, a Brandeis partner
and trial lawyer, who was stationed in Washington during the hearings
and conveyed information to the committee and to other Brandeis
defenders. As new allegations were made, Brandeis answered them;
he suggested new lines of inquiry or tactics; and he played at least a
limited role in mobilizing support and counterattacks.5
Brandeis became less patient as the Senate investigation spun out
over four months, but with few exceptions, his letters to McClennen
retained the same even tone. Despite his involvement, many of the
letters in this period from January through May of 1916 concern
other subjects, including Zionism, reform activities, and family mat-
ters. Ultimately, Brandeis's confirmation was recommended by the
subcommittee (in a 3-2 vote) and by the full committee (10-8); the
Senate confirmed the nomination in June, 1916 (47-22).
Despite detailed notes to the letters prepared by the editors, neither
the broad outlines of the campaign for confirmation nor the details
of successive skirmishes can be gleaned fully from the correspon-
dence. 7 In this struggle, Brandeis played only a part; and the open
clash in the hearing room and press was matched by a subterranean
3. P. 39.
4. P. 54.
5. Among the more colorful examples is a chart, prepared with Brandeis's encourage-
ment (p. 59), showing the common Boston social and financial links or loci of the 55
signers of the Lowell protest (Somerset Club, State Street offices, Back Bay residents,
etc.). Brandeis himself forwarded the contents to Walter Lippman (p. 80), who produced
a powerful New Republic editorial indicting "the most homogeneous, self-centered and
self-complacent community in the United States" (quoted in part, p. 81). The chart itself,
limned in a sinister spiderweb fashion, is reproduced in A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FRET
MAN'S LIFE 485 (1946).
6. E.g., p. 166.
7. The volume contains nothing so ambitious as, for example, Joseph Lash's recent
masterful introduction to the Frankfurter diaries. J. LASH, FRONT THE DIARIES OF FELIX
FRAN FURTER (1974). But the editors' notes following most of the individual Brandeis
letters range from one line identifying biographies to thumbnail sketches, occasionally
quite lengthy, of surrounding events.
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flux of political pressures and extraneous ambitions and interests.8
The letters do cast more light on the individual episodes in Bran-
deis's earlier career which gave rise to the charges of misconduct
against him. But the underlying litigation or public controversies
were themselves tangled and prolonged, and no sequences of letters
and annotations can go far toward illuminating the Warren will dis-
pute, the Ballinger-Pinchot battle, the contest over the New Haven
railroad, the liquor dealers' legislation in Massachusetts, and the other
episodes raked up and raked over during the four month Senate
inquiry. The editors' notes make the letters comprehensible, but with-
out far more background no reader can even begin to frame judg-
ments of his own.9
Despite its intrinsic interest for lawyers, in this collection of letters
the confirmation struggle is merely an overture. The resonating theme
of the correspondence, and its main fascination, is quite a different
subject: Brandeis's role as a central figure in the Zionist movement
during his early years on the Court. The remarkable story is worthy
of a novelist and even the phlegmatic style of the letters cannot
entirely conceal the drama.
When the letters in this volume commence in January, 1916, Bran-
deis had been serving for a year and a half as chairman of an American
Zionist group formed at the outbreak of the European war. Brandeis
himself was not then or afterwards a practicing Jew. He was a late-
comer to Zionism, having begun to give the subject serious interest
only from about 1912. Many members of the new organization who
selected him as chairman in the summer of 1914 may have expected
that his national reputation as a reformer would be his main con-
tribution. Instead, Brandeis dominated the organization from the out-
set and swiftly emerged as a power in the American movement. The
letters reveal why.10
8. The letters provide glimpses. Early on, Brandeis reported to Norman Hapgood:
Jacob Billikopf expressly asked "Do you object to my bringing pressure on [Senator]
Reed of Missouri to confirm nomination". I have thought it best not to answer this;
but Billikopf is a first rate man,--the head of Jewish charities there [in Kansas City],
and could be relied upon to be loyal.
P. 32.
9. Much of that background is provided in Mason's biography, supra note 5, which
devotes chapters to several of these matters. A. TODD, JusTIcF ON TRIAL (1964) is devoted
entirely to the confirmation proceedings.
10. In ANMERIcAN ZIONISM FROM HERZL TO THE HOLOCAusT (1975), Melvin Urofsky-one
of the editors of the letters-describes the conference that elected Brandeis:
So far everything had gone according to expectations: a relief fund inaugurated, a
well-known personality to head it, and now they would let him get some of his rich
friends to give more. Then the script suddenly changed. Brandeis, pleading his
ignorance of the many organizations represented, asked the assembly to stay on and
meet with him that evening and the following day. He needed to know more about
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A typical Brandeis directive, among many addressed to his new of-
fice staff in the organization, appears early in the volume" and is
succeeded by many more. In numbered paragraphs ("First," "Second,"
etc.), Brandeis approved the selection of named members of a nego-
tiating committee; declined a speaking engagement; requested infor-
mation on arrival dates of two persons; enclosed correspondence con-
cerning a prior meeting in Louisville; reported on another in Cin-
cinnati; directed that 500 copies of an article and 24 specified books
or pamphlets on Zionist matters (and "a bill for the same") be sent
to the organizer of the Cincinnati meeting; reported on organizing
efforts in Cincinnati and the prospects of forming a local bureau
("which they would doubtless be able to finance themselves"); re-
ported on meetings in Rochester and Buffalo and directed further
action; and-in a paradigmatic concluding paragraph-asked for reports
from "all of our societies" of their condition on December 29th, "and
when these reports are obtained, we must endeavor to secure a month-
ly report for submission in connection with the monthly financial
reports."' 2 As Brandeis wrote elsewhere, "A cleared desk is about as
essential to comfortable living as a hair cut."'"
Many such letters are paired with others, only slightly more per-
sonal in tone, to trusted lieutenants including Felix Frankfurter, to
peers in the movement including Judge Mack, and to individuals
around the country and abroad. Others touch on Brandeis's assistance
in achieving Wilson's support for the Balfour Declaration, favoring
in principle a "national home" for the Jewish people in Palestine.
Later letters report on Brandeis's post-war trips to Palestine and
Western Europe.'
4
As the letters begin with Brandeis triumphing in the confirmation
battle and establishing his leadership in the Zionist movement, so
they conclude with Brandeis in defeat. In June, 1921, the Brandeis-
Mack leadership was effectively deposed by American adherents of
Chaim Weizmann, the European Zionist leader. The causes of the
them, their leaders, their memberships, their administrative arrangements. For tile




12. Brandeis, relentless in maintaining financial discipline in the Zionist movement,
was himself generous to the movement, and to other causes. Mason's biography, supra
note 5, at 692, records gifts between 1890 and 1939 of almost S1.5 million, of which over
•5600,000 was for Jewish charities and Zionist causes.
13. P. 480.
14. When Brandeis became a Justice, he resigned from the offices lie held in the
Zionist organizations and continued his leadership with less prominence but equal
assurance.
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fissure were seismic strains-in philosophy, in personality, in style-
reflected throughout the letters; but symbolically, the precipitating
issue was the Brandeis faction's opposition to creation of a new fund
for Palestine which, contrary to Brandeis's view of sound financial
policy, commingled investments and contributions and divided re-
sponsibility for fund management.15
Although the confirmation fight and the Zionist movement are the
main subjects of the correspondence, numerous other letters are of
casual interest or more.' 0 Other letters exchanged with relatives il-
luminate aspects of Brandeis's character including his deep feeling
for his family and a vein of sentimentality that contrasts with vir-
tually all of his other correspondence. Very few of the letters refer
to the Supreme Court or make any substantive comment about its
processes or decisions.' 7
One cannot fully reflect on these letters without comparing them
with the letters of Justice Holmes, principally his splendid corre-
spondence with Sir Frederick Pollock and with Harold Laski.18 The
two Justices were among the greatest ever to serve on the Court, they
were contemporaries and friends, each wrote powerful and persuasive
opinions, and their votes often coincided. But the letters themselves
provide little but contrasts.
On the surface, Holmes's style in letter writing is witty and en-
tertaining, abounding in metaphor and well-turned phrases. The sub-
stance is speculative, literary, anecdotal, and historical, in a word, civ-
ilized. With Brandeis there is little that does not relate to current
events, and the language is unadorned. Where (rarely) he displays
his erudition or embellishes his prose, it is almost always subordi-
nate to his larger purpose to persuade, encourage, instruct or uplift.19
15. Less than 10 years later Brandeis's adherents found themselves back in power. As
lie himself wrote in anticipation, "The Romans of the great days occasionally lost a
campaign. They never lost a war ...because they never permitted a war to end until
they won." A. MASON, supra note 5, at 463.
16. These include correspondence with Albert Einstein, Zechariah Chafee, and-in
addition to the Zionist movement correspondence-Felix Frankfurter.
17. Among the few such references, one deserves quotation. To his wife, he wrote:
"Mhe U[nited]. S[tates]. S[upreme]. C[ourt]. goes merrily on. The main discussion at
luncheon was of shirts, where, when & how satisfactory ones may be secured ...." P. 554.
18. HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS (NI. Howe ed. 1941); HOLMES-LASKI LETTRrs (M. Howe
ed. 1953). There is also published correspondence between Holmes and diplomat Lewis
Einstein (HOLMEs-EINSTEIN LErrERs (J. Peabody ed. 1964)), and between Holmes and
Chinese jurist John C. H. WVu (JUsTIcE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: His BOOK NoTIcES
AND UNCOLLEcTED LrrERs AND PAPERS 151-208 (H. Shriver ed. 1936)).
19. In a letter to his brother concerning Government attempts at economic regulation
during the war, Brandeis wrote: "This price fixing job is about the hardest economic
problem ever tackled. The world has been at it from time to time for thousands of
)ears-ne,er with great success. . . . Send to the Library for Abbott's 'The Common
People of Ancient Rome' (Scribners 1911) & read the chapter 'Diocletian's Edict & the
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If Holmes's letters express the imagined temper and tenor of con-
versation at an 18th century dinner table, Brandeis's letters are the
office correspondence of a busy executive-at times, indeed, the dis-
patches of a military commander. While these letters can be read for
information and instruction, they cannot-unlike Holmes's-be read
for sheer pleasure. 20 Reading Brandeis's fact-filled letters, one is re-
minded occasionally of those reports on New England textile mills
that Brandeis urged Holmes to spend his summer reading. There is
little humor in the Brandeis letters.
Another contrast in these letters is deeper and more provoking.
Holmes needs no defense for indulging himself in the omnivorous
reading and spacious reflection that inform his letters. Still less is
any excuse required for Holmes's enduring resolve as a Justice not
to take part in the active struggles of the world outside the Court.
The dangers for the Court latent in Brandeis's multiple extracur-
ricular ventures are obvious.21
Yet, whatever the prudence of Brandeis's course, no one reading this
volume can easily withhold a sense of admiration for his driving com-
mitment to public affairs and his unrelenting impulse to ameliorate.
to improve, to reform, to create. Even if one shares Holmes's skeptical
doubts about what he called "betterment," there is a heroic quality
in Brandeis's efforts virtually distinct from his particular causes and
beliefs. As Holmes himself wrote: "[T]he mode in which the inevi-
table comes to pass is through effort .... And although with Spinoza
we may regard criticism of the past as futile, there is every reason
for doing all that we can to make a future such as we desire."2-- Those
words could fittingly have been addressed to the Brandeis letters.
High Cost of Living.'" P. 308. Brandeis's own prescription in the letter, coking a strong
sense of d6jii vu, was public "education & exhortation" and a seven-month, two-hour
daylight savings law to reduce coal consumption. Id.
20. Consonantly, Holmes's published correspondence includes both the letters by
Holmes and the letters to him, while the Brandeis letters follow the more common
practice and contain only those written by him. The editors of the Brandeis letters do
their best to fill the gap with their annotations, occasionally including actual quotations
from the correspondents' letters. Nevertheless, the effect is often like listening to one side
of a telephone conversation; the sense of symmetry is impaired een when complehension
is not.
21. Although Brandeis's Zionist activities dominate this volume, they ate only one
example of his involvement or readiness to be involved in public affairs outside the
sphere of the Court's business. For instance, one letter in this volume expresses to Frank-
furter Brandeis's wish for a private conference with John L. Lewis to instruct the labor
leader on economic policy ("If it could come about in a happy way to have him call on
me, I should like to tell him to go light on rate of wages & to insist upon regularity of
employment." (p. 559)). More intriguing, although double hearsay, is the statement else-
where by Frankfurter to Franklin Roosevelt concerning a proposed bill limiting the fees
of private counsel in suits against the Government: "Between ourselves, L.D.B. passed on
that bill before I submitted it to you." RoOSEVLT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPON-
DENCE 191 (M. Freedman ed. 1967).
22. 0. HOLmES, Ideals and Doubts, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 303, 305 (1920).
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